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Saving Money on Health Insurance Just Got a lot Easier . . .
Or Did It?: The Preserving Employee Wellness Programs
Act and its Impact on the Future of Employee Health
ZACHARY MACIEJEWSKI *
ABSTRACT
This Note addresses the growing use of employer-sponsored wellness programs in
the American workplace and the concomitant harms and risks these programs
impose on employee privacy and insurance costs. Specifically, this Note analyzes the
Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act (PEWPA)—a proposed law that would
allow employers to require employees to disclose genetic information to qualify for
an employer-sponsored wellness program (and the program’s associated insurance
premium benefits). This Note ultimately argues that employees and employee
advocacy groups must work to thwart PEWPA to preserve employee privacy in the
face of mounting corporate pressure to alter the structure of employer-sponsored
health insurance.
INTRODUCTION
Employer-sponsored wellness programs have secured a comfortable position in
corporate America since Congress and President Barack Obama enacted the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. The ACA amended the Public
Health Services Act (PHSA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to permit employers to offer wellness incentives as part of group health
plans. 1 The success of wellness programs, in large part, rests on employers’
presumptions that wellness programs decrease employer-borne health insurance
costs, bolster employee health through weight management regimens and smoking
cessation programs, and lead to a more productive workforce. 2 Employers deem the
programs an opportunity for employees to receive an insurance premium deduction
of up to thirty percent—an opportunity few employees have good reason to reject. 3
Legal and social sciences scholars have written much on the efficacy of wellness
programs and whether the enormous incentive to participate in (or penalty to abstain
from) them truly provides employees with a voluntary choice. Most scholars argue
that the programs do not. 4

* J.D. Candidate 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., Political
Science, 2017, Wabash College. I would like to thank Professor Jody Madeira for her
invaluable feedback, advice, and revisions during the seminar for which this Note was
originally drafted.
1. Alfred Lewis, Vikram Khanna & Shana Montrose, Employers Should Disband
Employee Weight Control Programs, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e91 (2015).
2. Id. at e91.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY L.J. 435, 437 (2013) (arguing that conditioning insurance premium
reductions on employee participation in wellness programs ironically reduces employee
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Around the same time wellness programs garnered popularity, direct-to-consumer
(“DTC”) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe and Color Genomics,
determinedly launched themselves into the consumer health arena. 5 DTC companies
provide services allowing consumers to trace their genealogy and genetic history and
to examine whether they are genetically predisposed to adverse health conditions,
such as cancer or heart disease. 6 While DTC testing services enjoy largescale
consumer participation, legal scholars criticize DTC companies for inadequately
disclosing to consumers how their genetic information may be used, especially when
consumers choose to analyze their genetic predisposition to disease. 7 Put differently,
critics argue that DTC companies do not secure the type of informed consent from
consumers that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
requires when doctors and patients engage in genetic testing. DTC genetic testing
companies do not provide results from the tests to a consumer’s doctor, but they do
warn consumers that insurers may use information consumers receive from the tests
against them via enlarged premiums. 8 Indeed, healthcare lawyers and medical
professionals are particularly concerned that consumers who learn they are
predisposed to disease will provide their test results to doctors, 9 and insurance
providers might increase premiums. 10
Wellness programs and DTC genetic testing are two separate phenomena.
Wellness programs allow employees to reduce health insurance costs through
pledges to exercise, quit smoking, and live more active and healthy lifestyles. 11 DTC
genetic testing, on the other hand, allow consumers to dig into their ancestral history

health). But see Ron Z. Goetzel, et al., Do Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs
Work?, 56 J. ENVTL. & OCCUPATIONAL MED. 927 (2014) (maintaining that workplace wellness
programs increase employee health).
5. See, e.g., Erika Check Hayden, The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of 23andMe, 550
NATURE 174, 176 (2017) (describing 23andMe’s 2009 resurgence into DTC genetic testing
for disease predisposition).
6. Id. at 177.
7. See, e.g., Erica Che, Note, Workplace Wellness Programs and the Interplay Between
the ADA’s Prohibition on Disability-Related Inquiries and Insurance Safe Harbor, 2017
COLUM. BUS. L. REV 280, 302–03 (2017) (arguing that employees do not receive proper
disclosure from employers about how their medical information can be used in workplace
wellness programs).
8. See Linsey Jones, FDA Regulation Defines Business Strategy in Direct-to-Consumer
CONNECTION
(Oct.
30,
2017),
Genetic
Testing,
BIOTECH
https://biotechconnectionbay.org/view-points/fda-regulation-defines-business-strategy-indirect-to-consumer-genetic-testing/ [https://perma.cc/K8EU-TMZU].
9. Id. In theory, providing information from a genetic test to a doctor would be a good
thing because doctors are able to screen for specific diseases. However, the fear is that
insurance companies will receive the genetic information before the disease is covered, thus
inflating premiums. See id.
10. See Julia Ries, There’s a Catch that Comes with Taking a 23AndMe Test,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/23andme-warnings-athome-genetic-test_n_5c01b108e4b0606a15b54dae [https://perma.cc/8CF6-A2JR]
(discussing how GINA often does not apply to life insurance, “meaning that these premiums
could very well fluctuate based on your test results.”).
11. Lewis, Khanna & Montrose, supra note 1, at e91.
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and discover whether they are predisposed to genetic health issues. 12 Nevertheless,
congressional concern that employers could use employee genetic information as a
weapon against employees prompted Congress to enact the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). 13 GINA prohibits employers from requesting
employee genetic information and from using employee genetic information against
them. As of now, GINA bars employers from factoring employee genetic
information into whether employees qualify for wellness programs. 14
Congress is currently considering the Preserving Employee Wellness Programs
Act (PEWPA). 15 The Act, which passed through committee on partisan lines, would
permit employers to require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for an
employer-sponsored wellness program—and thus to qualify for the insurance
premium deductions attached to the wellness program. 16 In light of the safeguards
Congress enacted to protect employee genetic information and employee autonomy,
Congress should strike down PEWPA and enact measures to bolster employee choice
and autonomy regarding the use of their genetic information. What is more, Congress
must ensure that if an employee provides genetic information they do so voluntarily.
Part I of this Note will analyze the Act in light of literature and litigation regarding
wellness programs and DTC genetic testing. Part II contemplates PEWPA’s legality
in light litigation stemming from the EEOC’s recently promulgated rules permitting
employers to require an employee’s spouse to provide genetic information to qualify
for a wellness program. Part III proscribes a plan to respond to the Act and its
implications, whether Congress enacts it or not.

12. Hayden, supra note 5, at 175–76.
13. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2)
(2018).
14. Id.
15. Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017); see
also Michael R. Dohn, Personal Genomics and Genetic Discrimination: Is Increased Access
a Good Thing, 45 W. ST. L. REV. 107, 124–25 (2018) (discussing how PEWPA would erode
GINA protections).
16. While the Act passed committee on partisan lines, with all Republicans voting for the
Act and all Democrats against it, President Obama, a democrat, sparked genetic data pooling
with the Precision Medicine Initiative—which has since evolved into the National Institute of
Health’s All of Us research program. All of Us works to solve America’s current healthcare
crisis through precision medicine—a medical technique that works to cure a specific patients
or groups of patients by using their genetic code to search for medical predispositions. See
SEAN RILEY, PRESERVING EMPLOYEE WELLNESS PROGRAMS ACT (HR 1313, 115TH CONGRESS),
DUKE SCI. POL. 2 (2017); Sy Mukherjee, It Might Soon Be Legal for Employers to Force You
Into a Genetic Test, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/genetic-testingworkplace-wellness-bill/ [https://perma.cc/8WEA-92CQ].
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I. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND GENETICS: PARTICIPATION
FACTORS, COERCION, & THE EEOC
This Part discusses the coercive role employer-sponsored wellness programs
play in the American workplace. Section A analyzes relevant statutes and litigation
in the employer-sponsored wellness program sphere and their potential impact on
employees. Section B places DTC genetic testing within the context of GINA and
relevant informed consent standards and fleshes out why DTC genetic testing
should be subject to informed consent standards to preserve GINA’s purpose.
A. Wellness Programs: The Path Towards Employer-Mandated Compulsion of
Genetic Information
The term “wellness program” typically refers to employer-sponsored health
promotion and disease prevention programs offered to employees. Some wellness
programs are part of an employer-sponsored group health plan, while others are not;
this Note will focus on the former. Wellness programs generally ask employees to
answer questions on a health risk assessment (HRA), undergo biometric screenings
for risk factors (such as high blood pressure or cholesterol), or partake in nutrition
classes and weight loss and smoking cessation programs. 17 Some employers
encourage employee spouses to participate in wellness programs, especially when
the employee is part of a group health plan. 18
Before Congress enacted the ACA, employers offered small-scale incentives, like
gift cards or additional vacation days, to employees who participated in wellness
programs. 19 But these incentives proved ineffective at reducing health costs. They
did not motivate employees to make substantial changes to their lifestyles. 20 To make
wellness programs worth employer time and effort, Congress raised the ceiling on
employer-sponsored, health-conditioned insurance premium deductions to thirty
percent—meaning that employees participating in employee-only health insurance
plans could see nearly $1,800 per year deducted from their insurance premiums. 21
Studies show that most employees participate in employer-sponsored wellness
programs because they believe the programs offer a convenient method to bolster
their health. 22 The potential to save money on health insurance premiums and copays
increase employee desire to take advantage of wellness programs, leading many

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 3.
Id.
See Lamkin, supra note 4, at 450.
See Lewis, Khanna & Montrose, supra note 1, at e91.
Id. See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC’S FINAL RULE ON
EMPLOYER WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 2
(2016) (finding that under employee-only plans with a self-option premium of $6,000,
employees participating in wellness programs could save up to $1,800 via the ACA’s thirty
percent insurance premium deduction scheme).
22. See Alan Kohll, Why More Employees Don’t Embrace Wellness Programs, and How
to Fix It, FORBES (June 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alankohll/2017/06/22/whymore-employees-dont-embrace-wellness-programs-and-how-to-fix-it/#2d07acf01d95
[https://perma.cc/5SZ9-T73T].
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employees not to question the terms of the contract they enter into with their
employer. 23 To qualify, many employees simply check a box pledging they will work
out, eat healthier, and refrain from smoking. 24 From an employee perspective, how
could a regime designed to save you money and make you healthier harm you? None
of these requirements are subjectively or objectively bad, and they will only foster a
healthier population. 25
Comparing employer-sponsored wellness programs to adhesion contracts, which
they might well be, may help shed additional light on why employees participate in
wellness programs. Most consumers never read the terms and conditions of contracts
that will cost them substantial sums of money because they know that, if they
disagree with the terms, they cannot use the product or service. 26 This is true for
powerful companies like Amazon and Apple that present customers with lengthy
electronic disclosures that they can easily pass over by clicking a button. It would
not be surprising, then, if employees never read the terms of their employersponsored wellness contract. After all, why read something that is supposed to make
you healthier and save you money if you never read the terms for something for
which you are spending money? It might be that “innocuous” programs encouraging
you to exercise and not smoke would not trigger protective instincts.
On their face, wellness programs attached to large insurance premium deductions
should encourage healthy behaviors, decrease employee risk to injury and disease,
and suppress employer susceptibility to increased healthcare costs. 27 However,
studies on whether employer-sponsored wellness programs have actually cultivated
healthier workforces and decreased employer-borne healthcare expenses have
yielded largely negative results. 28 In fact, wellness programs with such large

23. Angela Lashbrook, Your Boss Wants You Healthy for All the Wrong Reasons, THE
OUTLINE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/6714/your-boss-wants-you-healthy-forall-the-wrong-reasons?zd=1&zi=has5yfeh [https://perma.cc/S2DS-4P75].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. David Greene, Do You Read the Terms of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, Research
Shows, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-you-readterms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows [https://perma.cc/5AMN-47ZF].
27. See Sharon Begley, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Improve Employees’ Health?,
STAT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016) https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/19/workplace-wellnessprograms-employee-health/ [https://perma.cc/L9SQ-TWFM]; Austin Frakt & Aaron E.
Carroll, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Work? Usually Not, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/upshot/do-workplace-wellness-programs-workusually-not.html [https://perma.cc/KP3G-Z5VC].
28. See SOEREN MATTKE, HANGSHENG LIU, JOHN P. CALOYERAS, CHRISTINA Y. HUANG,
KRISTIN R. VAN BUSUM, DMITRY KHODYAKOV & VICTORIA SHIER, RAND HEALTH,
WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 45-46 (2013) (finding smoking
cessation to be the only health behavior where achieving the health goal earned a greater
reward than participating in the program); Sharon Begley, Exclusive: ‘Workplace Wellness’
Fails Bottom Line, Waistlines – RAND, REUTERS (May 24, 2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellness/exclusive-workplace-wellness-fails-bottom-linewaistlines-rand-idUSBRE94N0XX20130524 [https://perma.cc/T2HN-ZDC9] (reporting that
participants in wellness programs lose an average of one pound every three years and that
participating does not yield significant reduction in cholesterol levels). See also Ann Hendrix
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insurance premium deductions may actually harm employee health, coerce patients,
and impair their autonomy. 29
The question of whether wellness programs unduly coerce employees has
garnered much attention in corporate, employment, and healthcare law circles. 30 In
2017, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) won a court battle
against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding EEOC
rules permitting employers to charge or penalize employees choosing not to
participate in health screenings or provide health information related to employersponsored wellness programs. 31 The EEOC’s rule would have authorized employers
to impose insurance premium rates up to two or three times the rate imposed on
employees who did provide requested information and engage in health checks. 32
The District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the EEOC rule, holding that
a thirty percent insurance premium hike on employees who chose not to participate
in a wellness program was considered involuntary. 33
AARP’s strategy of framing the issue as a penalty imposed on employees for
failing to participate in wellness programs, rather than as an incentive to partake in
them, proved key to why AARP won the lawsuit and shed light on employer motives
in the wellness and insurance industries. 34 The court’s decision was somewhat novel.
Many courts and scholars who sympathize with corporate and employer interests
have refused to call the insurance premium deductions “penalties” but instead label
them “incentives” for employees to provide employers with sought-after
information. 35 But while the court handed employees and patients a win, it also

& Josh Buck, Employer-Sponsored Wellness Programs: Should Your Employer Be the Boss
of More than Your Work?, 38 SW L. REV. 465, 466–67 (2009) (urging employers to recognize
employee concerns regarding discrimination based on genetic information).
29. See Lamkin, supra note 4, at 466 (finding that financial incentives attached to
wellness programs may harm patient health by forcing patients to partake in aggressive
medical procedures they would otherwise not participate in).
30. Compare Press Release, American Benefits Counsel, Consistent Federal Policy and
Regulatory Framework Vital for Workplace Wellness Programs 1 (Mar. 1, 2017) (asserting
that wellness programs are beneficial to employers and employees, have been successful,
Congress must streamline legislation to ensure wellness programs remain a valuable tool for
employers), with David Frank, Workers Score Court Victory on Workplace Wellness Rules,
AARP (Aug. 14, 2017) (encouraging lawmakers to restrict incentives attached to wellness
programs and ensure employees are not penalized for not participating in programs that do not
have a strong record of success).
31. AARP v. United States Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238
(D.D.C. 2017). Dara Smith, lead attorney for the AARP Foundation Litigation, praised the
court’s ruling, claiming “[i]t means two fewer years of coercive penalties imposed on
employees who exercise their civil right to keep private health-related information private in
the workplace.” David Frank, AARP Wins Victory for Worker’s Civil Rights, AARP (Dec. 22,
2017),
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2017/eeoc-workers-rightsfd.html [https://perma.cc/H9XU-354Y].
32. Frank, supra note 31.
33. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45.
34. Frank, supra note 31.
35. While the 2017 AARP case dealt primarily with procedural issues, the court did not
cite to a single case discussing why the EEOC’s thirty percent premium hike was not
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punted on key provisions of the EEOC rule that permit employers to require an
employee’s spouse to produce genetic information to participate in a wellness
program. If an employee’s spouse refuses to provide the information, the employee
does not receive the insurance premium deduction because their spouse cannot
participate in the wellness program. 36 The court’s decision not to address the genetic
component has proved crucial to the PEWPA’s fate.
Some scholars suggest wellness programs can coerce employees if the programs
diminish an employee’s right to informed consent. 37 Informed consent ensures that
patients understand the benefits and risks of medical procedures and voluntarily
consent to or refuse them. 38 Not all wellness programs should be considered “medical
procedures.” 39 For example, a wellness program that requires an employee to
exercise or participate in a smoking cessation program would not be considered a
medical procedure because it does not require the employee to establish a doctorpatient relationship. However, wellness programs that require patients to receive
medical treatment, such as taking medication or undergoing medical tests, should be
considered “medical procedures” governed by informed consent because they do
require patients to establish a doctor-patient relationship. 40 And full disclosure
applies in contexts outside of medical procedures as well. Thus, whether a wellness
program violates a patient’s right to informed consent should center on the nature of
the plan, including the treatment regimen and whether the patient’s choice to
participate in that regimen is voluntary.
Whether a decision is truly voluntary centers on whether the patient is
substantially free from external influence. 41 Faden and Beauchamp, two influential
ethics scholars, maintain that outside influence weakens voluntariness if the patient
cannot resist the stimulus. 42 Threats to penalize patients for not partaking in certain
actions, as well as incentives inviting them to participate, can violate a patient’s right
to informed consent if the patient finds the penalty or incentive difficult to resist. 43
And while employers can no longer “penalize” employees for not participating in
wellness programs, they can still offer “incentives” for participating. In the realm of
insurance premium deductions, drawing the line between a “penalty” and an
“incentive” is virtually impossible; deducting money from an employee’s premium
and requiring an employee to pay additional money are two sides of the same coin.
Thus, it follows that wellness programs that induce patients to make choices
regarding medical procedures they would not have made but for the “incentive”
violate patients’ rights to informed consent.

voluntary. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 243. See Lamkin, supra note 4 at 441-42 (noting that
wellness programs can be framed as either penalties or incentives and, thus, determining when
something is one of the other is quite hard to do).
36. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45.
37. Lamkin, supra note 4, at 446-47.
38. Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 8 (1986).
39. Id. at 358.
40. See Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 256.
43. Id. at 261–62.
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While the ACA amended the PSHA and ERISA to permit employers to offer
wellness programs, it did not amend key provisions of the PSHA, ERISA or the ADA
barring insurance companies from discriminating against employees based on their
participation in a wellness program. 44 Nevertheless, insurance companies quickly
took advantage of the amendments and pitched employers with plans centered on
reducing healthcare costs via wellness programs. For example, Blue Care Network
of Michigan began offering employers a group health plan called “Healthy Blue
Living.” 45 Employees participating in Healthy Blue Living received enhanced
benefits, like decreased deductibles for ninety days. After ninety days, employees
have to visit their primary physician to begin a wellness program. Blue Care requires
physicians to fill out a form confirming employee participation in the plan. If
employees refuse to participate, they lose their enhanced benefits and have to pay
higher copays and deductibles. 46
BeniComp Advantage offers a similar program but reverses the order in which
employees see decreased healthcare costs. BeniComp starts by increasing employee
deductibles. Only once employees agree to comply with wellness program
conditions, including provisions requiring them to take prescribed medications, do
deductibles and premiums decrease. 47 Most employees know that wellness programs
will require them to exercise or quit smoking, but they often do not know that they
will have to take prescribed medication or undergo medical tests. These deductions
are not de minimus, and large discounts are much more likely to coerce employees
to participate in employer-sponsored wellness programs, even if it means consuming
unwanted medication or enduring invasive tests. 48
For Lamkin, this Hobson’s choice vitiates informed consent. 49 Lamkin argues that
incentivizing employees to participate in wellness programs can vitiate informed
consent because the programs may require employees to participate in healthcare
regimens they would not adopt but for the financial penalty for not doing so. 50 If
wellness incentives become too large, it is reasonable to assume that they influence
employees to make decisions against their values, thereby rendering the incentive a
“penalty.” 51 When wellness program mandates shift from nothing at all to smoking
cessation and weight-loss regimens to requiring participants to take certain
medications, the informed consent waters become increasingly murky. 52
Encouraging people to quit smoking or hit the gym through incentive programs does
not violate informed consent. But cloaking a “penalty” as an “incentive” and coercing
patients into deciding based on a financial inducement does. 53

44. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed.
Reg. 33158 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
45. Lamkin, supra note 4, at 449.
46. Id. at 449–50.
47. Id. at 449–51.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 457.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 450.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 450–57.
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Persad discounts Lamkin’s argument, claiming that wellness programs cannot
harm employees because encouraging better health and wellness cannot place
employees in a position worse than what they were in prior to participating in the
program. 54 Persad compares a potential wellness requirement pressuring a patient to
consume certain medications with a taxi driver’s requirement to go to the eye doctor
to retain her license. He suggests that, because requiring a taxi driver to go to the
doctor and receive new glasses does not vitiate informed consent simply because it
requires the taxi driver to make a decision based on financial incentives, it is not
coercive to require an individual to take medicine to qualify for an insurance
premium deduction. 55
B. Employer-Compelled Genetic Testing: GINA, 23andMe & their Turbulent
Relationship with Informed Consent in Consumer Settings
Section B.1 discusses the history and purpose of GINA, as well as the role
that employers and insurance companies play in undermining GINA’s goals.
Section B.2 examines the lack of an informed consent standard in the DTC genetic
testing realm. Specifically, Section B.2 warns consumers about the potential harms
of providing DTC genetic testing companies sensitive medical information that is
not subject to a confidential patient-physician relationship.
1. GINA and Safeguarding Patient Genetic Information
GINA stemmed, in part, from congressional concern that employers would try to
take advantage of massive technological advances in genetic information processing
to obtain employee genetic information and use it to make cost-related decisions. 56
Passed with almost unanimous support, GINA bars insurance companies from
denying coverage or charging larger premiums to healthy individuals purely because
of their genetic predisposition to developing a disease. 57 GINA also prohibits
employers from making hiring, firing, or promotion decisions based on an
individual’s genetic makeup. 58
When Democrats enacted the ACA in 2010, they also invested billions of dollars
into precision medicine. 59 Precision medicine is an approach to patient care where
doctors ask patients to participate in genetic tests, the results of which help formulate
a personalized patient-treatment plan centered on the individual’s genetic makeup.
Doctors use precision medicine most often when treating cancerous tumors, because
patient genetics allow doctors to understand the disease better and to develop

54. Govind Persad, Paying Patients: Legal and Ethical Dimensions, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH
177, 228–29 (2018).
55. Id.
56. See Riley, supra note 16, at 2.
57. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2)
(2018).
58. Id.
59. See Riley, supra note 16, at 2.
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personalized treatment regimens unique to a specific disease and patient. 60 Patients
must voluntarily provide their genetic information and must consent to doctors using
it before undergoing any medical procedures. 61
The law provides special protection to genetic information, especially in the
medical realm. 62 Currently, Title II of GINA undoubtedly provides the strongest
protections. Title II bars employers and insurance companies from requesting
employee genetic information, and thus encourages patients to provide genetic
information for medical procedures, especially precision medicine. 63 GINA works to
quell patient concern that insurers and employers will penalize them for their genetic
makeup and predisposition to disease. 64 But insurance companies skirted ACA
provisions barring them from discriminating against employees based on their
participation in wellness programs by inducing employers to do the work for them
via insurance premium deductions. 65 Now, insurers are attempting to do the same
with genetic information. 66
2. 23andMe and Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Consumer Foray into
Dangerous Waters
Consumers remain fascinated with genealogy and genetic makeup. 67 Genetics and
genealogy are mysterious to most people, yet they control who we are as humans—
more than almost anything else. 68 Aside from information passed on from relatives,
it is hard to tell where we really come from in the world. And even if our relatives
possess insight on our genealogy, they cannot provide information about our genetic
predisposition to disease. Many families have an idea if they are predisposed to heart
disease or diabetes based on struggles their relatives have had with those ailments.
But simply knowing your familial track record for disease does not provide insight
into why genetics predispose us to certain diseases and whether we carry those traits.
Past experiences leave us anxious and wanting more. DTC genetic testing companies
allow consumers to delve into their genetic code and have helped consumers solve
some of the enigmatic issues about their lineage, their familial risk for cancer, and
how they can plan a safer pregnancy and optimize their diet and fitness regimens. 69

60. See Precision Genomics, IND. UNIV. HEALTH, https://iuhealth.org/find-medicalservices/precision-genomics [https://perma.cc/2LPC-J8HU].
61. See Precision Medicine in Cancer Treatment, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/types/precision-medicine
[https://perma.cc/K5XB-9JW8].
62. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2).
63. Id.
64. See Riley, supra note 16, at 3.
65. See Lamkin, supra note 4, at 449.
66. See Riley, supra note 16, at 2.
67. See Karen Norrgard, DTC Genetic Testing for Diabetes, Breast Cancer, Heart
Disease, and Paternity, NATURE EDUCATION (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/dtc-genetic-testing-for-diabetes-breast-cancer698/ [https://perma.cc/PDP5-TTVS] (discussing the various congenital health benefits
associated with DTC genetic testing).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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While DTC genetic testing companies assert that they do not diagnose consumers,
this contention is highly debatable, especially when considering their recent foray
into genetic health risk (GHR) reports, which approximate a user’s risk for
developing a disease. 70
As an in vitro test, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies DTC
genetic tests as medical devises. 71 Unlike laboratory-developed tests (LDTs),
physicians do not order DTC genetic tests. Consequently, DTC genetic tests do not
require a physician or trained expert to explain the results of the test, though the FDA
regulates DTC genetic testing companies and requires them prove that they are
accurately and safely relaying information to consumers. 72
Experts estimate that twelve million Americans participated in DTC genetic tests
in 2017, meaning that one in twenty-five American adults possess access to personal
genetic data. 73 The DTC genetic testing industry reached almost $100 million in sales
in 2017, with experts predicting the industry’s value to skyrocket to upwards of $350
million by 2022. 74 Consumer interest in genetic literacy will persist—at least for the
near future—and on many levels, that is remarkable. But as the adage goes: “With
great power, comes great responsibility.” 75 Genetic information is immensely
powerful. Consumers now have the ability to trace their ancestry—something most
people never fathomed could happen. 76 What most consumers do not know,
however, is how this powerful, enlightening tool can be wielded against them—
especially by insurance companies. 77
GINA bars insurance companies from requiring individuals to provide them
information they receive from genetic testing companies. 78 However, if a person
receives disheartening information from a DTC test and provides that information to
their doctor, who then diagnoses the patient with a disorder or prescribes treatments
tailored to specific ailments, insurance agencies can become privy to that
information. 79 For example, 23andMe outlines in their terms and conditions that
“[g]enetic [i]nformation that you choose to share with your physician or other health
care providers may become part of your medical record and through that route be
accessible to other health care providers and/or insurance companies in the future.” 80
The terms provide that if an individual receives information about adverse health

70. See Jones, supra note 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See SPIDER-MAN (Marvel Comics 2010).
76. See Matloff, supra note 67.
77. See generally Deepthy Kishore, Test at Your Own Risk: Your Genetic Report Card
and the Direct-to-Consumer Duty to Secure Informed Consent, 59 EMORY L.J. 1553, 1584–85
(2010) (discussing how consumers must be informed via the reasonable patient standard
because they likely do not understand the effects of DTC genetic testing).
78. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2)
(2018).
79. Dustin W. Massie, 23, My Employer & Me: On Genetic Testing, Privacy and
Employment, 74 BENCH & B. MINN. , 12 (2017).
80. Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/
[https://perma.cc/N5FX-8Q5T].
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conditions and does not disclose the information to their insurance provider when
asked to do so, they may be committing a fraud. 81 For the average consumer with
scarce knowledge of insurance contracts and disclosure requirements for avoiding
fraud, these terms are likely terrifying . . . if consumers read them.
As with terms regarding employer-sponsored wellness programs (and most other
contracts), consumers likely do not read the terms and conditions associated with
their DTC genetic testing kit. 82 What is more, unlike employer-sponsored wellness
programs, where an employer or human resources specialist could spell out the terms
of the wellness program contract to the employee, no one is helping the consumer
interpret or understand the gravity of participating in a DTC genetic testing service. 83
After all, that is a key feature of DTC genetic testing: no doctors, no geneticists, no
testing specialists. For many people, this is a perk—but it is a perk with consequences
they hardly understand. 84 It may be annoying and costlier to go to a doctor or a lab
to undergo genetic tests to see if you are predisposed to disease. But at least if you
go to the doctor, you are subject to informed consent and covered by a doctor-patient
relationship. 85 What is more, you get an expert, in-person opinion on what your
genetic information means and how your genetics could adversely impact your
health. 86 DTC genetic testing services provide none of these safeguards. 87 By using
these services, you embark on your genetic journey alone.
Scholars, including Kishore, agree almost unanimously that consumers using
DTC genetic testing services should receive some variation of informed consent—
whether it is actually called informed consent or not. 88 While informed consent
traditionally is only required where there is a physician-patient relationship, the
nature of DTC genetic testing is largely medical, especially when consumers test for
predisposition to disease. 89 Indeed, if the sort of testing that DTC genetic testing
companies provide were performed by a doctor, informed consent would be
required. 90 Logically, then, it makes sense to require DTC genetic companies to
provide some variation of informed consent to ensure consumers receive some form
of risk disclosure.
Courts have applied two informed consent standards to determine what qualifies
as adequate disclosure to a patient: the reasonable physician standard and the
reasonable patient standard. 91 The reasonable physician standard places a premium

81. Id.
82. See Greene, supra note 26.
83. See Jones, supra note 8.
84. See generally Kishore, supra note 77, at 1589 (discussing how consumers rarely
understand the terms of their DTC genetic test).
85. See Jones, supra note 8; See also Kishore, supra note 77 (arguing that regulators
should require DTC genetic testing companies to provide consumers with adequate
information regarding their DTC genetic test—akin to the requirements for testing done in
labs or by physicians).
86. Kishore, supra note 77, at 1585–87, 1589.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1584–85.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 8.
91. Kishore, supra note 77, at 1584–85.
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on patient welfare but sacrifices patient autonomy by allowing physicians to choose
what is best for the patient. 92 Under this standard, physicians only have to disclose
what the reasonable physician in their situation would disclose to a patient, not what
the reasonable patient would want to hear. The reasonable physician standard also
permits doctors to invoke the “therapeutic privilege” if they believe disclosing
information to their patient will harm their welfare. 93
The reasonable patient standard, which courts impose only in a minority of
jurisdictions, emphasizes patient autonomy more than the reasonable physician
standard. 94 This standard seems to be ideal in consumer settings in general and the
DTC genetic testing setting in particular because patients will receive information
about their predisposition to disease regardless of the harm and trauma that may
result. 95 DTC genetic testing companies cannot evade the potential trauma
consumers may feel from their results. They cannot invoke the therapeutic privilege,
because if they did, their services would be futile. What is more, allowing DTC
genetic testing companies to use the reasonable physician standard could pose a
financial conflict of interest, as companies may refrain from disclosing information
about genetic testing out of fears that results or consequences from the tests may
discourage consumer participation. 96 According to Kishore, the reasonable patient
standard is the most pragmatic informed consent standard available in the DTC
genetic testing arena. 97
As DTC genetic testing companies delve further into GHR reporting and continue
to develop diagnostic services that incur upon doctor’s medical opinions, consumers
should be aware of what they are signing up for. 98 This is especially true as PEWPA
looms in Congress. As this paper will discuss in Part III, DTC genetic test results that
spur a visit to the doctor could drastically affect a patient’s wellness program
requirements and insurance liabilities. What was a seemingly innocuous attempt to
trace patient genetic predisposition to disease could lead patients down an invasive
and expensive battle with employers and insurers steadfast on curbing medical costs.
II. JUDICIAL GLOSS . . . OR LACK THEREOF: THE PRESERVING EMPLOYEE WELLNESS
PROGRAMS ACT IN LIGHT OF EEOC LITIGATION
On its face, PEWPA smacks of illegality—primarily because it flies in the face of
GINA. GINA specifically bars insurers and employers from discriminating against
employees based on genetic information or from requiring them to provide genetic
information involuntarily. PEWPA encourages the latter and makes it easier to
accomplish the former. A hallmark of GINA is that it only permits employers and
insurers to see employee healthcare information in aggregate form. PEWPA would
drastically weaken GINA, allowing employers, for the first time, to see genetic

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Jones, supra note 8.
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information of specific individuals. Nevertheless, judicial hesitance to address the
issue casts doubt on whether a court would strike down PEWPA.
In 2017, AARP provided the court an opportunity to strike down an EEOC rule
permitting employers to require spouses of employees to submit to genetic testing to
qualify for a wellness program and its concomitant insurance premium deduction. 99
The District Court for the District of Columbia handed down a major win to
employee advocates but punted on the genetic testing issue—holding only that the
thirty percent insurance premium hike on employees who choose not to participate
in an employer-sponsored wellness program was involuntary and thus violated
GINA. 100
The court’s reluctance to address the genetic testing requirement in the EEOC’s
rules, even in dicta, suggests that the court either does not know how it would rule
on the issue or that it does not a see a blatant problem with the requirement. 101 While
AARP did not ask the court to strike down the genetic testing provision, the court’s
decision to strike down the insurance premium rate as an involuntary penalty was
groundbreaking. 102 Thus, it is somewhat surprising that a progressive bench did not
even mention the genetic testing requirement. The court’s silence speaks even louder
considering PEWPA passed the committees on Commerce, Energy, and Ways and
Means unchanged and on partisan grounds just five days before the court issued its
opinion. 103 While proper judicial etiquette would counsel against discussing
PEWPA, courts often seize on opportunities to address controversial issues. What is
more, although PEWPA was not ripe for review, the EEOC rules permitting
employers to require employee spouses to submit to genetic testing were. Thus, the
court could have addressed the genetic testing issue in the EEOC rules in its 2017
opinion, but it did not. 104
The EEOC Rules and PEWPA appear different in one key aspect: to whom they
apply. 105 Specifically, the EEOC rules only permit employers to require the spouse
of an employee to submit to genetic testing. The EEOC rules do not allow employers
to require an employee or an employee’s children to submit to genetic testing,

99. Compare Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong.
(2017), with Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2)
(2018). See also Mark A. Rothstein, Jessica Roberts & Tee L. Guidotti, Limiting Occupational
Medical Evaluations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 523, 564 (2015) (arguing that because PEWPA,
on its own terms, claims not to violate GINA, employers should enjoy an added layer of
protection against employee genetic discrimination claims).
100. AARP v. United States Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238,
245 (D.D.C. 2017).
101. See id. However, it would be very hard for them to not see the problem, considering
GINA directly prohibits insurers and employers from requiring employees to involuntarily
provide them with their genetic information.
102. See Frank, supra note 31.
103. Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017).
104. Id. See also AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 238.
105. See Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017);
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2) (2018).
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whereas PEWPA would. 106 The EEOC justified its rule on the basis that employee
spouses do not share similar genes with an employee, unlike children, who would
share similar genes to the employee. 107 Thus, the EEOC contends that requiring
employee spouses to submit to genetic testing does not foster an environment for
employers to discriminate against an employee based on their genes. 108 This logic is
shaky on two grounds.
First, under group health plans that cover employee spouses, employers have just
as much of an incentive to discriminate against spouses based on genetic information
and health abnormalities as they do with employees. In cost and coverage terms,
employees and employee spouses are the same since employers cover them both. So,
while employees may not face discrimination from their employer at the office, there
is nothing stopping them from facing discrimination via an insurance premium hike
if their spouse does not participate in the genetic testing. Such an effect on an
employee’s pocketbook could easily spill over into a workplace dispute—
consequently leading to the discrimination that the EEOC said was unlikely to
happen. 109 The EEOC is using employee spouses as test subjects and as a means to
eventually test employees—only testing employees will come with a congressional
blessing.
Second, GINA adopts ERISA’s definition of “employee,” which includes an
employee of an employer and the employee’s spouse and children. 110 The EEOC
claims that, because spouses do not have a similar genetic makeup and predisposition
to disease as their spouses, employees and their spouses face minimal risks of
discrimination. 111 Whether this rationale is true is debatable at best. But even if it is
true, it almost certainly violates GINA—especially when analyzing the text of the
statute. 112 While the letter and spirit of legislative policy goals are important, the text
of GINA clearly bars the EEOC rules as written. And because PEWPA takes the
EEOC rules one step further and permits employers to require employees and their
children to submit to genetic testing, PEWPA should be struck down as well if
passed. Thus, while the EEOC rules and PEWPA appear distinct, they are actually
very similar. Judicial analysis of either the EEOC rules or PEWPA should yield the
same result: eradication of the genetic testing requirement.
The EEOC has remained in the dark about their next moves—most likely waiting
to see how Congress responds to PEWPA. If PEWPA passes, the EEOC’s job—at
least as it pertains to their court order to promulgate new rules—would likely be
finished because PEWPA would encompass its work. For PEWPA to pass judicial
muster and not violate GINA, the EEOC, or whichever scheme and entity Congress
charges to regulate employee genetic testing, will have to ensure that any genetic
information employees provide to employers for wellness programs will be provided
voluntarily. But what the court considers “voluntary” is largely elusive. Are twenty-

106. Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act; Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §2000ff-1(b)(2).
107. See Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N , supra note 21, at 3.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §2000ff-1(b)(2).
111. See Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 21, at 3.
112. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §2000ff-1(b)(2).
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rive percent penalties for nonparticipation voluntary? Must the penalty dip under
twenty percent? Fifteen percent? Or, more realistically, should the degree of
voluntariness reflect an individual’s financial capacity? Some employees can
stomach a thirty percent penalty. Others could not take on a five percent hit.
Perspective matters, and whatever choice Congress and administrative regulators
make, they must keep that in mind.
III. MOVING FORWARD: PEWPA’S FATE & RESPONDING TO ITS AFTERMATH—
REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME
In its 2017 opinion striking down the EEOC’s wellness programs insurance
premium hike as involuntary, the court ordered the EEOC to promulgate new rules
by August 2018 to make the incentives voluntary. 113 In a May 2018 status update,
the EEOC stated that it does not plan on updating its rules in time for the August
2019 deadline. 114 Insurance and employment experts suggest the EEOC’s defiance
rests in large part on a belief that President Trump will appoint a new EEOC
commissioner. 115 With Republicans gaining additional seats in the Senate, this hunch
becomes ever more likely. If the Trump administration turns its eye towards PEWPA
and employer access to employee genetic information, one could only guess at what
the administration would seek to accomplish. 116 The fact that Democrats spurred the
wellness program rush via the ACA will likely only fuel Republicans to push
insurance premium deductions conditioned on wellness program participation to
their outermost bounds.
With the current political climate and slate of Supreme Court justices in mind,
employee advocates and policymakers need to develop a plan to address PEWPA if
it passes and if it fails. If PEWPA passes, employee advocates need to develop a
mechanism to make the current wellness programs more effective—to the point
where employers have faith that they do not need to require employees to submit to
genetic testing to qualify. And if PEWPA fails, either in Congress or if the judiciary
strikes it down, employee advocates need to develop a plan to counteract PEWPA
2.0. Otherwise the win will be short-lived. This paper will offer my opinions
regarding both scenarios below.
A. Living in a World with PEWPA and Mitigating its Aftermath
The worst-case scenario for employees is if Congress approves PEWPA in its
current state. As written, PEWPA would permit employers to condition employersponsored wellness programs—and the insurance premium deductions associated
with them—on whether employees submit to genetic testing. While most bills do not

113. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 245. Unsurprisingly, the court did not hint as to what
“voluntary” means.
114. Anu Gogna & Ben Lupin, EEOC Wellness Update and Planning for 2019, WILLIS
TOWERS WATSON (May 9, 2018),
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2018/05/eeoc-wellness-update-andplanning-for-2019 [https://perma.cc/2TBG-WYSV].
115. Id.
116. Id.

44

I N DI A NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:028

make it through Congress unaltered, most bills do not make it through Ways and
Means either. 117 Given that Democrats just regained control of the House of
Representatives, it is unlikely they would vote to approve PEWPA as currently
written. Nevertheless, it is not hard to envision a world with PEWPA, especially if
Republicans can convince Democrats tied to the ACA and big business to bend in
their favor. If Congress approves PEWPA, employee advocates need to ensure that
insurance premium deductions stemming from PEWPA do not coerce employees to
make involuntary decisions.
Whether Congress approves PEWPA or not, one thing is certain: big business
wants to require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for wellness
programs and their concomitant insurance premium deductions. 118 The American
Benefits Counsel, which advocates on behalf of Fortune 500 companies like AT&T,
ExxonMobile, CBS, and MetLife, has penned multiple memos urging Congress to
bolster its efforts to improve employer-sponsored wellness programs via genetic
testing requirements. 119 With this type of money and pressure backing PEWPA, it is
imperative that employee advocates pressure the EEOC to promulgate regulations
with penalties significantly below the thirty percent mark that the court struck down
in 2017. Presenting the issue to employers in the context of informed consent could
help.
Framing employer-sponsored wellness programs in the context of informed
consent would humanize them—especially if employers require employees to submit
to genetic testing. After all, few things define human health as much as our genetic
makeup. 120 While a court has found a thirty percent penalty for not participating in a
wellness program to be involuntary, coercive, and in violation of GINA, employee
advocates need to push this logic further and persuade the judiciary to apply it as a
modified informed consent standard for employees. 121 That is, the court and
Congress need to require employers to disclose the nature of wellness programs to
their employees to ensure that employees understand (or, at least, understand better)
the potential physiological and financial impact that the testing could bring about. To
date, PEWPA is the most ideal vehicle to accomplish this task.
Courts have been hesitant to apply informed consent outside of the physicianpatient relationship, particularly because the physician-patient relationship differs
from almost all other fiduciary relationships. However, requiring employees to
submit to genetic testing could qualify as a medical procedure, and thus fall within
the bounds of informed consent, because it treads on diagnosing patients. This paper

117. See generally, Ezra Klein, Almost None of the Bills Introduced into Congress Ever
Becomes a Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2014/01/16/almost-none-of-the-bills-introduced-into-congress-ever-becomes-alaw/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.04a8b76e4361 [https://perma.cc/D8G4-3Z4Y].
118. See Brief for the American Benefits Council, p. 1, The Preserving Employee Wellness
Program Act (2015).
BENEFITS
COUNCIL,
119. See
About
Us,
AM.
https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/about-the-council/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/QML7-KED7] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
120. See Hayden, supra note 5, at 176.
121. AARP v. United States Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238,
243-45 (D.D.C. 2017)
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argues that Congress (but more realistically, courts) should require employers to
provide employees an informed consent-like disclosure regarding how their genetic
information will be used in their employer-sponsored wellness program because
these requirements require employees to undergo medical procedures. 122 Just as DTC
genetic testing providers should be required to employ the reasonable-patient
standard under Kishore’s analysis, Congress should require employers and DTC
genetic testing companies to provide employees with information that the reasonable
employee would find relevant to a wellness program because employees are
submitting to tests that, if conducted, could harm them financially and jeopardize
their ability to get future insurance. 123 Because wellness programs are designed to
prevent disease and ailments, employees do not find themselves in a position that
would warrant the therapeutic exception. 124 Thus, the reasonable-patient standard is
the ideal standard for genetic testing in the wellness programs context because this
standard will provide employees with a framework to view their predisposition to
disease and to help prevent developing illnesses. 125 The reasonable physician
standard is ill-equipped to deal with this issue, just like it would inadequately protect
consumers in the DTC genetic testing context, because employers would find
themselves with an inherent conflict of interest. 126 While employees are not
consumers in the same sense that DTC genetic test users are, ideally, they will make
their decision whether to participate in the program voluntarily, like consumers.
To skirt informed consent, wellness program providers will likely require
employees to submit to a form of DTC genetic testing and provide those results to
the wellness programs provider to develop their personalized program. If wellness
program providers pursued employee genetic information via this route, they would
be doing exactly what DTC genetic testing companies warn against: providing
genetic information to medical professionals who, in turn, would use your genetic
information in a way that may alter your insurance costs. If Congress approves
PEWPA, employee advocates could press for regulations requiring doctors or
certified lab technicians to conduct the genetic tests. This way, employees will
receive at least some form of informed consent regarding their genetic information
and will enter a physician-patient relationship with binding ethical duties. However,
by providing genetic information to a medical professional, a patient will be more
likely to be diagnosed with an ailment 127—and thus face steeper insurance costs—
than if she used a DTC genetic testing service. Neither option is perfect, so analyzing
the best way to protect employee interests will be key to developing a strategy to
combat PEWPA.

122. I say “informed consent-like” because the FDA, Congress, courts, and other
regulators have not extended informed consent to other genetic testing procedures not
conducted by doctors, with DTC genetic testing serving as the prime example.
123. Kishore, supra note 77 at 1584–85.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Again, being diagnosed with an ailment, while not good, is better than its alternative
in most contexts because patients will have the opportunity to receive treatment. I present it as
a negative because the diagnosis would provide the opposite goal of requiring patients to go
to doctors to receive testing. See generally Lamkin, supra note 4, at 438.
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If Congress approves PEWPA, it should direct the EEOC to establish baseline
disclosure subjects that employers must provide to employees. Employers should
have to disclose how employee genetic information may cause their insurance rates
to increase if their genetic tests result in them being diagnosed with an ailment.
Further, should employees choose not to provide their genetic information,
employers should comprehensively explain how their insurance costs will increase.
Employers must emphasize that employees will not face discrimination in the
workplace based on their genetic predisposition to disease or on their decision
whether to participate in a wellness program. Most importantly, employers should
underscore to employees that employee health trumps cost savings. PEWPA will
likely polarize employers and employees if enacted. Cutting costs on employee
health insurance plans only works if an employer has employees.
The American Benefits Council and employers will likely protest congressional
mandates to provide informed consent-like disclosure to employees because
employers do not have a physician-patient relationship with employees. 128 Moreover,
they will likely argue that employees will have already received informed consent
from the doctor or lab technician who conducts their genetic test or from the terms
and conditions of the DTC genetic testing kit they use. Employers could also adopt
Persad’s argument that informed consent is not necessary in the wellness program
context because to qualify for employment, all employees must make healthcare
decisions that cut against their autonomy. 129 However, Persad missed the mark when
he compared requiring an employee to ingest medication to qualify for a wellness
program to requiring a taxi driver to pass an eye exam to qualify for a job.
Persad conflates a requirement to protect the welfare of others (passing an eye
exam so you can see the road and not hit citizens and/or crash your car and harm
your customers) with a mandate to take medication that, if not ingested, likely would
not affect third parties. 130 Individuals have a right to informed consent, but that right
cannot infringe on the rights of others, especially if that infringement can result in
public harm. 131 Requiring a patient to choose between taking a medication (a form
of medical procedure) or risk losing a $1,500 insurance premium deduction does not
implicate third parties, and neither do genetic tests (which, if performed by a doctor,
are medical procedures) to determine an employee’s predisposition to disease. Persad
correctly identifies that the law will always require employees to meet certain
medical benchmarks to qualify for a job. 132 But the law must place these
requirements on a spectrum and not as binary choices. Expect employers to advance
this argument in the beginning to gauge how much they must give to attain their
interests.
With the 2017 AARP decision in mind, employers should be conscious to not
impose coercive insurance premium penalties (or provide insurance premium
incentives—they are the distinctions without differences) on employees who do not

128. See Press Release, American Benefits Counsel, supra note 30.
129. See Persad, supra note 54, at 229.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., K.H. Satyanarayana Rao, Informed Consent: An Ethical Obligation or Legal
Compulsion?, 1 J. CUTANEOUS AESTHETIC SURGERY 33, 34 (2008) (asserting that one’s right
to informed consent “cannot impinge the rights of others”).
132. See Persad, supra note 54, at 229.

2020]

S A V I NG MO N E Y O N HE A L TH I NS UR A N CE

47

participate. Although the District Court for the District of Columbia did not strike
down the EEOC’s rules pertaining to genetic testing requirements, it indicated its
displeasure with the EEOC’s push to allow employers to penalize employees who do
not participate in wellness programs. 133 It would be wise for the EEOC to alter its
penalty/incentive thresholds well below thirty percent. Further, to withhold judicial
scrutiny, the EEOC should require employers to disclose how genetic testing will
impact employee insurance costs. If Congress passes PEWPA (or a variation of it),
transparency will be key to fostering trust between employers and employees and
truly bolstering employee well-being.
B. What Doesn’t Kill Congress (and Big Business) Makes it Stronger: Fighting
PEWPA 2.0
If PEWPA fails in Congress, or if a court strikes it down, it would be naïve to
think that this will be the last we hear from wellness programs centered on genetic
testing requirements. The American Benefits Council vehemently supports this bill,
and its members will likely continue funding legislation designed to decrease
employer-borne healthcare costs. 134 And they should. But employee advocates must
make every effort to convince employers that compelled genetic testing is not the
answer.
It is easy to see why employers—and more importantly, insurers—would want to
require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for insurance premium
deductions. Precision medicine has worked remarkably well—almost entirely
because patients provide their genetic information for doctors to develop a treatment
plan based on their genetic makeup. 135 On the other hand, wellness programs have
failed to save employers and insurers money and have failed to create a healthier
workforce. 136 One possible explanation for their failure could be based on the lack
of employee genetic information provided to tailor employee-specific workout
programs, diet plans, and medical treatment regimens. If employees provided their
genetic information to help create a program personalized to their genetic needs,
there is a good chance it would work. But for many generations currently using
employer-sponsored wellness programs, especially older ones, it is probably too late.
While employer-sponsored wellness programs have been prevalent since 2010,
the ACA incentivized medical professionals to implement them to help prevent
early-onset diseases. 137 The goal of wellness programs is to prevent chronic ailments,
such as heart disease and obesity, from developing in the first place. But many of the
employees currently suffering from illnesses that wellness programs were designed
to prevent began developing the illnesses long before they participated in their first
wellness program. 138 It is hard to determine how accurate a disease prevention

133. AARP v. United States Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238,
243-45 (D.D.C. 2017).
134. See Press Release, American Benefits Counsel, supra note 30.
135. See Precision Medicine in Cancer Treatment, supra note 61.
136. See Lewis, Khanna & Montrose, supra note 1, at e91.
137. Id.
138. See Elizabeth Heubeck, Workplace Wellness Programs Work Best when Bosses Buy
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mechanism is on a group of people who developed unhealthy habits and ailments
early on in their lives. For participants with heart disease or clogged arteries, a
wellness program will not cure them—and it is not supposed to. Rather, wellness
programs work to prevent these issues from ever starting. 139 The public should
scrutinize any government-sponsored initiative meticulously, especially when
consumers direct billions of dollars into it. However, well-intentioned initiatives
deserve a fair shot. Wellness programs have not received a fair shot yet. Employers
should remain keen on providing insurance premium deductions conditioned on
participation in a wellness program, but they should also familiarize themselves with
how they are supposed to work.
To help see better results without coercing employees to submit to genetic testing,
employers should implement stronger quality-assurance measures to ensure
employees are actually making good on their promise to participate in a wellness
program. Many employees see wellness programs as an annoying cost-saver, rather
than an opportunity to improve their health. 140 Employees with this mindset thus
often do not carry out the goals their wellness program provider designed for them. 141
For example, some male employees have admitted that they lied about receiving a
mammogram solely to receive enough points to qualify for insurance premium
deductions conditioned on their participation in wellness programs. 142 Another
employee stated that the nicotine tests in her program are easy to cheat. She said
“Two people on my team smoke cigars and chew tobacco . . . . They know how long
it takes for nicotine to clear from their system to test negative, so they stop long
enough just for the test, then fire right back up again.” 143 While not all employees try
to game the system, the fact that it is easy to certainly does not give employers a
strong impression of the programs they help pay for. 144 Employee advocates need to
find a way to resolve these problems. Otherwise, why would employers not resort to
genetic testing, especially since it has worked wonders in the medical world?
CONCLUSION
PEWPA presents Congress with an opportunity to make a lasting difference in the
healthcare and employment law sectors. Whether Congress approves PEWPA or not,
one thing is for certain: employers will continue working to make wellness programs,
and the concomitant insurance premium deductions attached to them, worth their
money. And they should. It is up to employee advocates, legal scholars, and medical
professionals to find a way to improve wellness programs without requiring
employees to submit to involuntary genetic testing to qualify for a wellness program.
Money talks, and it is clear which way the money is moving. Finding a way to push

https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/workplace-wellness-programs-workbest-when-bosses-buy-into-them-studies-show/2018/11/26/c273339a-e775-11e8-a9399469f1166f9d_story.html?utm_term=.870537b30f54 [https://perma.cc/8NT3-HCUL].
139. Id.
140. Kohll, supra note 22.
141. Id.
142. See Lashbrook, supra note 23.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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PEWPA off track is imperative to preserving the integrity of GINA and placing
employee rights above the bottom line.

